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bstract
This paper presents a brief analysis of representative measures of inflation expectations from Central Bank of Brazil’s Survey
f Professional Forecasts that are alternative to the median response. We build time series with the mode and core measures of
nflation expectations from the panel of professional forecasts surveyed from January 2002 to September 2012. We compare them
o the median response with respect to their predictive power in a 12-month-ahead horizon. We also compare the predictive power
f the alternative measures with the realized core of consumer price inflation.
 2013 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
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esumo
Esse artigo apresenta uma breve análise de medidas representativas alternativas à mediana da pesquisa de expectativas conduzida
elo Departamento de Relacionamento com Investidores e Estudos Especiais (Gerin) do Banco Central do Brasil. A partir do painel
e expectativas coletadas de janeiro de 2002 a setembro de 2012, construímos séries históricas de núcleos e da moda das expectativas
ara a inflac¸ão, que, a seguir, são comparadas com a mediana em relac¸ão ao seu poder preditivo para o horizonte de 12 meses à
rente. Comparamos também o poder preditivo dessas medidas com respeito ao núcleo de inflac¸ão do IPCA.
 2013 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
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1.  Introduction
Market forecasts surveyed by the Central Bank of Brazil since 1999 are reported daily at the institution’s website and
published weekly at the “Focus” reports. They have become an important reference to the discussion of macroeconomic
prospects in Brazil, especially with respect to inflation. The univariate measures that are usually chosen to represent
the panel of forecasts both at the “Focus” reports and at the Inflation Report (Chapter 6) are the median forecasts
and their standard deviations.1 Throughout the rest of the world, the use of the panel median or mean is also widely
disseminated.2
Carvalho and Minella (2012) present a detailed study of the predictive power of the median forecasts surveyed by
the Central Bank of Brazil for a 12-month-ahead horizon. They show that in the analyzed period, the median response
does not present systematic bias, which implies a reasonable predictive power, in spite of their failure in efficiency
tests. Other studies have investigated the predictive power of the median responses of Central Bank of Brazil’s survey
for varied forecast horizons.3
This paper assesses the predictive power of other measures representative of the panel of inflation forecasts surveyed
by the Central Bank of Brazil. In particular, we build series of modes and core measures of inflation forecasts for a
12-month-ahead horizon.
Except for the symmetric trimmed mean core and for one of the asymmetric core measures, all measures that
we investigate are statistically different from the median response. In terms of predictive power, all measures present
systematic bias in the complete sample. The evidence of bias is slightly smaller for the median. However, this conclusion
does not hold for shorter sub-samples. Furthermore, for the complete sample, the investigated measures are more
appropriate proxies of the smoothed trimmed core inflation index than of the actual headline consumer price inflation.
Except for the mode, the investigated measures do not present systematic bias when compared to the core inflation.
Notwithstanding, for subsamples beginning in January 2003 or January 2004, which are less contaminated by the
confidence crisis that had hit the economy in previous years, all measures present systematic bias when compared to
the inflation core.
2.  Building  measures  that  are  representative  of  the  panel  of  inﬂation  forecasts
Aggregate measures such as the mean, median and standard deviation of the expectations panel surveyed by
the Central Bank of Brazil, and others derived from these three, are reported daily at the central bank’s web-
site (https://www3.bcb.gov.br/expectativas/publico/en/serieestatisticas). The survey currently encompasses over 100
registered participants.4
We used the complete database of the survey, from January 2002 to September 2012, to build five core inflation
expectations series in addition to a series of modes. The methodology is detailed in what follows. For all series, the
data refer to forecasts surveyed at each day of the month corresponding to the day previous to that used to produce the
Top-5 rank published by the Investor’s Relations Office of the Central Bank of Brazil. The forecast horizon considered
was 12-months, accumulated from the month following the survey date onwards.
1 More recently, in the Inflation Report of March 2011, the Central Bank of Brazil started to publish the median of selected segments of survey
participants.
2 For instance, the Inflation Perspectives chapter of Bank of England’s Inflation Report reports the mean expectations of a group of surveyed
professionals. The mean is also the representative measure chosen to report the Macro Markets Home Price Expectations Survey, as well as Consensus
Economics forecasts, which, in turn, also reports the individual forecasts. US Michigan Survey of Expectations reports the median response as its
representative measure.
3 Kohlscheen (2010), Guillén (2008) and Carvalho and Bugarin (2006), for instance.
4 For a complete description of the survey’s database, please refer to Marques et al. (2003).
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The first core measure built for this study was the symmetric trimmed mean (Fig. 1 and Appendix A). Its computation
nvolved ordering all projections according to their magnitude at each sampling day, and excluding those placed in the
uter 10% ranges. The remaining 80% of the individual forecasts were used to calculate the mean.
Fig. 1. Symmetric trimmed mean core of 12-month-ahead inflation expectations.
Second, we built an asymmetric median and mean core of inflation expectations. To this end, we carried out two
symmetry tests at each surveyed date: one based on Pearson’s asymmetry coefficient5 and another based on the third
oment of the sampling distribution.6 In both tests, distributions are classified as asymmetric when the absolute value
f the resulting asymmetry coefficient is larger than 0.3. The results of this initial identification test of asymmetry in
he expectations series are reported in Fig. 2. The direction of the asymmetry does not always coincide in both tests.
n fact, there was contradiction in 40% of the sample.
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Fig. 2. Asymmetry tests of the 12-month-ahead inflation expectations distributions.
5 Pearson’s Asymmetry coefficient = ((Mode − Mean)/(Standard Deviation)). The mode was computed according to the methodology described
n this paper.
6 Asymmetry(x) = E(x−Mean(x))3(Std(x))3 .
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After determining whether the distribution of expectations at each survey date is symmetric or not according to each
type of asymmetry test, we removed the outliers as follows:
• If the distribution was found to be asymmetric, we removed the 2.5% smallest and the 2.5% highest values of the
sample at each survey date;
• If the distribution was asymmetric to the left (i.e., mode < mean), we removed the 5% highest values of the sample
at each survey date;
•  If the distribution was asymmetric to the right (i.e., mode > mean), we removed the 5% lowest values of the sample
at each survey date.
This asymmetric trimming methodology is used by the Central Bank of Brazil to calculate the daily average base
rate (Selic), aiming at eliminating observations that are less representative of the aggregate forecast and which might
bias the sample mean.
There is an important degree of arbitrariness in the construction of asymmetric core measures. First, the size of the
trim (5%) in the distribution tails, regardless of the degree of asymmetry found, does not necessarily imply that the
remaining distribution will be void of asymmetry. Second, the methodology requires computation of the sample mode,
which also bears an important degree of arbitrariness. The resulting asymmetric core series are presented in Fig. 3 and
in Appendix A.Fig. 3. Asymmetric core measures of 12-month-ahead inflation expectations.
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Finally, we built a series of modes for each survey date (Fig. 4 and Appendix A). The mode is more representative
f a “consensus” measure than the median. However, its computation is not straightforward. To compute the mode, we
rst built distribution histograms of the forecasts at each survey date. Next, we identified the mean point of the interval
ith the highest concentration of forecasts. This calculation, however, is sensitive to the size of the bin chosen to slice
he sample. The choice of the size of the bin for each survey date was arbitrary, and had the purpose of obtaining only
ne modal bin.
Fig. 4. Mode of 12-month-ahead inflation expectations.
.  Comparing  the  alternative  measures  to  the  median  and  testing  its  predictive  power
We carried out statistical tests to investigate whether the alternative measures representative of inflation forecasts
ere statistically different from the median. These tests are inspired in the unbiasedness tests traditionally used in the
iterature (e.g., Marimon and Sunder, 1993; Zarnowitz, 1985; Keane and Runkle, 1990). The tests consist of assessing
he joint null H0: c(1) = 0 and c(2) = 1 in the equation:
Alternative measure =  c(1) +  c(2) ×  Median +  White noise (1)
Rejecting H0 implies that the alternative measure under evaluation is statistically different from the median. The
esults are reported in Tables A1 and A3 in Appendix A.
The series of symmetric trimmed means is statistically indistinguishable from the series of medians. With respect
o the asymmetric trimmed mean and median cores, the statistical tests point to important differences between the core
eries and the median. The only exception is one of the core series obtained from the Pearson coefficient.
With respect to the mode, when we built the histograms, we noticed that the shape of the forecast distribution is
ighly variable over the sampled period, presenting great asymmetry at certain moments. The tests indicate a significant
ifference between the mode and the median.
Comparing the alternative measures with the realized value of consumer inflation (IPCA), we tested the null H0:
(1) = 0 at the equation
Forecast bias of the alternative measure =  c(1) +  noise(MA(12)) (2)
here the bias present in the alternative measure corresponds to the difference between the headline consumer inflation
nd the considered alternative measure of inflation forecasts. Rejecting H0 implies that there is evidence of bias in
he forecasts. In addition, we used a Newey–West covariance matrix with MA(12)7 errors, as suggested by Keane
nd Runkle (1990), since the forecast errors for a 12-month-ahead horizon accumulate along these months in face of
nexpected shocks.
7 For further details on the reasons for using the correction in the covariance matrix for these tests, please refer to Carvalho and Minella (2012).
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The predictive power of inflation expectations can be measured by the p-value obtained in the unbiasedness tests.
The lower the p-value, the stronger the evidence of systematic forecast bias. Table 1 presents the p-values of the
unbiasedness tests for 12-month-ahead inflation forecasts compared with the realized headline consumer inflation. The
tests use data up to December 2011 since market expectations surveyed at that date refer to realized inflation 12 months
ahead, i.e., accumulated until December 2012, which corresponds to the last date for which actual inflation data was
available when this paper was prepared.
Table 1
P-value of the unbiasedness tests for 12-month-ahead inflation expectations.
2002:1 to 2011:12   2004:1 to 2011:12   2003:1 to 2011:12
MedianComplete Panel 0.015 0.016 0.120
Mean 0.008 0.018 0.167
Mode 0.012 0.014 0.081
Trimmed MeanSymmetriccore 0.008 0.016 0.143
trimming 10% of each tail)
Asymmetric core
Trimmed MeanPearson Coef. 0.009 0.017 0.138
Trimmed Median 0.017 0.017 0.115
Trimmed Mean3rdmomentcriterium 0.008 0.023 0.197
Trimmed Median 0.012 0.019 0.138
The results of the unbiasedness tests show that, for the complete sample, all investigated measures present systematic
bias. When we select sub-samples that exclude one or another crisis period, the results change. In Carvalho and Minella
(2012), a chosen sub-sample started in January 2004, which excludes the effects of a crisis of confidence in the future
conduct of monetary policy after a leftist presidential candidate was elected back in 2002. Since the data sample used
in that work went until 2007, the authors could not find any indication of bias in the median inflation expectation for
that subperiod. However, in 2007 and 2010, there were important forecast errors, and the tests considered in this paper
still point to a systematic bias in all investigated statistics, even if we exclude the confidence crisis. If we restrict the
sample to begin in January 2003, when the forecast errors were strongly negative, in average these errors cancel out
with the positive errors of the following year, and the tests reject the null of a systematic bias.
4.  Are  inﬂation  expectations  better  indicators  of  the  headline  consumer  inﬂation  or  of  the  core  inﬂation?
Ranchhod (2003) carries out exercises to verify the predictive power of inflation expectations surveyed in New
Zealand. One of the results obtained is that, even when survey participants forecast headline inflation, their forecasts
are a more adequate representation of smoothed measures of inflation, such as exclusion core indices. The reason
seems to be that inflation of more volatile items in the consumer price index is more difficult to be anticipated.
Inspired by that work, we compared inflation expectations for the headline inflation in Brazil with actual values
of the smoothed and trimmed mean core index for consumer price inflation. The results are presented at Table A4 in
Appendix A.
In the complete sample,8 the unbiasedness tests do not indicate systematic bias in forecasts when compared with
the core inflation. The only exception to that was the mode. However, this result is strongly affected by counterbalance
of the sizable positive forecast errors at the beginning of the series with the sizable negative forecast errors observed
in 2006 and 2008. If we begin the tests in January 2004, all investigated statistics show an important forecast bias.
5.  Concluding  remarksThis brief paper shows that the mode of inflation expectations for a 12-month-ahead horizon and a great number of
asymmetric core measures present important differences with respect to the median inflation expectation.
8 We did not carry out tests for the trimmed median or mean core.
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In the complete sample, which includes years in which the crisis of confidence in the future conduct of economic
olicy in Brazil affected most noticeably the predictive power of inflation expectations from professional forecasters,
ll analyzed measures (median, symmetric trimmed cored, asymmetric core and mode) present systematic forecast bias
or the headline consumer inflation. However, in the sub-sample that begins in January 2003, the analyzed inflation
orecasts cease to present bias, likely due not to an improvement in predictive capacity, but to statiscal cancelling out
f positive through negative errors. In fact, the choice of subsample influences the result.
Inspired in Ranchhod (2003), we carry out tests to check whether the forecasts made for the headline inflation are
ore appropriate representations of a less volatile measure of inflation, such as the smoothed trimmed core consumer
nflation. Contrary to the unbiasedness tests for the headline inflation, there is no indication of systematic bias in the
nalyzed measures (with the exception of the mode using a 95% confidence interval) when we compare the inflation
xpectations with the core inflation. However, for subsamples beginning in January 2003 or January 2004, the tests
ndicate forecast bias.
ppendix  A.
See Tables A1–A5
able A1
est of statistical difference between the symmetric trimmed mean and the median 12-month-ahead inflation expectations.
ependent variable (Y): symmetric trimmed mean core of inflation
xpectations
ample: January 2002 to September 2012
umber of observations: 129
quation: Y = c(1) + c(2) × Median of infl. expectations
Coefficient Std t-ratio P-value
(1) −0.037 0.020 −1.840 0.068
(2) 1.007 0.004 273.266 0.000
2 0.998302 Mean dependent var 5.216861
djusted R2 0.998289 SD dependent var 1.357727
egression Std 0.056165 Akaike −2.90568
SR 0.400616 Schwarz −2.861342
og likelihood 189.4163 Hannan–Quinn −2.887664
-statistics 74674.53 Durbin–Watson 2.187917
rob (F-statistics) 0
ald test: c(1) = 0, c(2) = 1
est statistic Value dF Probability-statistics 1.727744 (2, 127) 0.1818
hi-square 3.455488 2 0.1777
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Table A2
Tests of Statistical difference between the asymmetric trimmed mean and median core and the median inflation expectations.
Dependent variable (Y): asymmetric trimmed mean core of inflation
Expectations (Pearson coeff.)
Sample: January 2002 to September 2012
Number of observations: 129
Equation: Y = c(1) + c(2) × Median expectations
Coefficient Std t-ratio P-value
c(1) 0.000 0.022 −0.002 0.999
c(2) 1.000 0.004 245.890 0.000
R2 0.997904 Mean dependent var 5.216725
Adjusted R2 0.997887 SD dependent var 1.348531
Regression Std 0.061982 Akaike −2.708548
SSR 0.487912 Schwarz −2.66421
Log likelihood 176.7013 Hannan–Quinn −2.690532
F-statistics 60462.02 Durbin–Watson 1.80517
Prob (F-statistics) 0
Wald test: c(1) = 0, c(2) = 1
Test statistic Value dF Probability
F-statistic 0.022819 (2, 127) 0.9774
Chi-square 0.045638 2 0.9774
Dependent variable (Y): asymmetric trimmed median core of inflation
Expectations (Pearson coeff.)
Sample: January 2002 to September 2012
Number of obs: 129
Equation: Y = c(1) + c(2) × Median expectations
Coefficient Std t-ratio P-value
c(1) 0.041 0.010 3.952 0.000
c(2) 0.992 0.002 517.150 0.000
R2 0.999525 Mean dependent var 5.215422
Adjusted R2 0.999522 SD dependent var 1.336546
Regression Std 0.029233 Akaike −4.211672
SSR 0.108528 Schwarz −4.167334
Log likelihood 273.6529 Hannan–Quinn −4.193657
F-statistics 267443.7 Durbin–Watson 1.867673
Prob (F-Statistics) 0
Wald test: c(1) = 0, c(2) = 1
Test Statistic Value dF Probability
F-statistic 9.79399 (2, 127) 0.0001
Chi-square 19.58798 2 0.0001
Dependent variable (Y): asymmetric trimmed mean core of inflation
Expectations (asymmetry measured by the 3rd moment)
Sample: January 2002 to September 2012
Number of obs: 108
Equation: Y = c(1) + c(2) × Median ExpectationsCoefficient Std t-ratio P-value
c(1) −0.189 0.036 −5.234 0.000
c(2) 1.041 0.007 155.116 0.000.
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Table A2 (Continued )
R2 0.994749 Mean dependent var 5.242026
Adjusted R2 0.994708 SD dependent var 1.406198
Regression Std 0.102294 Akaike −1.706541
SSR 1.328946 Schwarz −1.662203
Log likelihood 112.0719 Hannan–Quinn −1.688526
F-statistics 24060.97 Durbin–Watson 1.654712
Prob(F-Statistics) 0
Wald test: c(1) = 0, c(2) = 1
Test statistic Value dF Probability
F-statistic 22.17044 (2, 127) 0
Chi-square 44.34087 2 0
Dependent variable (Y): asymmetric trimmed median core of inflation
Expectations (asymmetry from the 3rd moment)
Sample: January 2002 to September 2012
Number of obs: 129
Equation: Y = c(1) + c(2) × Median expectations
Coefficient Std t-ratio P-value
c(1) −0.036 0.010 −3.603 0.000
c(2) 1.008 0.002 541.864 0.000
R2 0.999568 Mean dependent var 5.22563
Adjusted R2 0.999564 SD dependent var 1.35903
Regression Std 0.028369 Akaike −4.271629
SSR 0.102212 Schwarz −4.227291
Log likelihood 277.5201 Hannan–Quinn −4.253614
F-statistics 293616.4 Durbin–Watson 1.593859
Prob(F-Statistics) 0
Wald test: c(1) = 0, c(2) = 1
Test statistic Value dF Probability
F-statistic 15.06299 (2, 127) 0
Chi-square 30.12599 2 0
Table A3
Test of statistical difference between the mode and the median inflation expectations.
Dependent variable (Y): mode of inflation expectations
Sample: January 2002 to September 2012
Number of obs: 129
Equation: Y = c(1) + c(2) × Median expectations
Coefficient Std t-ratio P-value
c(1) 0.367 0.069 5.346 0.000
c(2) 0.925 0.013 72.629 0.000
R2 0.97649 Mean dependent var 5.195851
Adjusted R2 0.976305 SD dependent var 1.261863
Regression Std 0.194242 Akaike −0.424042
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Table A3 (Continued )
SSR 4.791699 Schwarz −0.379704
Log likelihood 29.35074 Hannan–Quinn −0.406027
F-Statistics 5274.929 Durbin–Watson 1.99016
Prob (F-statistics) 0
Wald test: c(1) = 0, c(2) = 1
Test statistic Value dF Probability
F-statistic 17.94627 (2, 127) 0
Chi-square 35.89254 2 0
Table A4
P-value of the unbiasedness tests of aggregate measures of inflation expectations as predictions for the symmetric trimmed mean core of realized
consumer inflation (IPCA).a
January 2002 to September 2012 January 2004 to September 2012
Median 0.2184 0.0001
Mean 0.0975 0.0000
Mode 0.0433 0.0002
Symmetric core of expectations 0.1138 0.0000
a Test equation: Forecast error of the measure representative of expectations = c(1) + noise (MA(12)). The p-values shown refer to the test with
H0: c(1) = 0.
Table A5
Series of measures representative of inflation expectations for the 12-month-ahead consumer inflation (IPCA).
Mode of 12-month-ahead inflation expectations
Jan-01 5.0 Jun-06 3.7
Feb-01 4.8 Jul-06 3.9
Mar-01 4.6 Aug-06 3.7
Apr-01 4.5 Sep-06 4.0
May-01 4.1 Oct-06 4.1
Jun-01 4.6 Nov-06 3.8
Jul-Ol 4.6 Dec-06 4.2
Aug-01 5.7 Jan-07 4.2
Sep-01 5.5 Feb-07 3.9
Oct-01 8.0 Mar-07 4.2
Nov-01 8.8 Apr-07 4.6
Dec-01 11.0 May-07 4.7
Jan-02 10.3 Jun-07 5.2
Feb-02 9.8 Jul-07 5.3
Mar-02 8.4 Aug-07 5.4
Apr-02 8.1 Sep-07 5.2
May-02 8.4 Oct-07 5.1
Jun-02 7.3 Nov-07 5.6
Jul-02 6.5 Dec-07 5.0
Aug-02 6.5 Jan-08 4.7
Sep-02 6.3 Feb-08 4.5
Oct-02 6.2 Mar-08 4.6
Nov-02 6.1 Apr-08 4.5
Dec-02 6.0 May-08 4.0
Jan-03 6.0 Jun-08 4.0
Feb-03 5.3 Jul-08 4.0
Mar-03 5.4 Aug-08 4.3
Apr-03 5.5 Sep-08 4.4
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Table A5 (Continued )
May-03 5.6 Oct-08 4.4
Jun-03 5.8 Nov-08 4.4
Jul-03 5.9 Dec-08 4.5
Aug-03 5.8 Jan-09 4.6
Sep-03 6.1 Feb-09 4.3
Oct-03 6.2 Mar-09 4.5
Nov-03 5.9 Apr-09 4.6
Dec-03 5.8 May-09 5.1
Jan-04 5.7 Jun-09 4.8
Feb-04 5.4 Jul-09 4.8
Mar-04 5.3 Aug-09 4.9
Apr-04 5.3 Sep-09 5.1
May-04 5.2 Oct-09 5.0
Jun-04 5.1 Nov-09 5.0
Jul-04 5.0 Dec-09 5.5
Aug-04 4.9 Jan-10 5.5
Sep-04 4.7 Feb-10 5.2
Oct-04 4.5 Mar-10 5.2
Nov-04 4.7 Apr-10 5.5
Dec-04 4.5 May-10 5.0
Jan-05 4.7 Jun-10 5.1
Feb-05 4.5 Jul-10 5.5
Mar-05 4.3 Aug-10 5.5
Apr-05 4.2 Sep-10 5.7
May-05 4.2 Oct-10 5.8
Jun-05 4.6 Nov-10 5.5
Jul-05 4.2 Dec-10 5.2
Aug-05 4.2 Jan-11 5.3
Sep-05 4.3 Feb-11 5.3
Oct-05 4.0 Mar-11 5.4
Nov-05 4.2 Apr-11 5.5
Dec-05 4.2 May-11 5.4
Asymmetric trimmed median core of inflation expectations (asymmetry from the 3rd moment)
Jan-01 4.9 Jun-06 3.5
Feb-01 4.6 Jul-06 3.6
Mar-01 4.8 Aug-06 3.7
Apr-01 4.4 Sep-06 3.8
May-01 4.3 Oct-06 3.8
Jun-01 4.5 Nov-06 3.9
Jul-Ol 4.5 Dec-06 4.2
Aug-01 5.1 Jan-07 4.2
Sep-01 5.5 Feb-07 4.2
Oct-Ol 7.9 Mar-07 4.4
Nov-01 10.2 Apr-07 4.3
Dec-01 11.6 May-07 4.7
Jan-02 10.4 Jun-07 5.1
Feb-02 9.8 Jul-07 5.3
Mar-02 9.3 Aug-07 5.3
Apr-02 8.6 Sep-07 5.2
May-02 8.1 Oct-07 5.3
Jun-02 7.5 Nov-07 5.4
Jul-02 7.0 Dec-07 5.1
Aug-02 6.4 Jan-08 4.8
Sep-02 6.3 Feb-08 4.5
Oct-02 6.1 Mar-08 4.2
N
D
J
Fov-02 6.0 Apr-08 4.1
ec-02 6.0 May-08 4.0
an-03 5.8 Jun-08 4.1
eb-03 5.3 Jul-08 4.1
22 F.A. de Carvalho / EconomiA 14 (2013) 11–26
Table A5 (Continued )
Mar-03 5.4 Aug-08 4.1
Apr-03 5.5 Sep-08 4.2
May-03 5.8 Oct-08 4.3
Jun-03 6.0 Nov-08 4.4
Jul-03 6.0 Dec-08 4.5
Aug-03 6.1 Jan-09 4.5
Sep-03 6.2 Feb-09 4.4
Oct-03 6.2 Mar-09 4.6
Nov-03 6.0 Apr-09 4.7
Dec-03 5.8 May-09 4.9
Jan-04 5.6 Jun-09 4.9
Feb-04 5.4 Jul-09 5.1
Mar-04 5.4 Aug-09 5.1
Apr-04 5.5 Sep-09 5.1
May-04 5.2 Oct-09 5.1
Jun-04 5.1 Nov-09 5.2
Jul-04 5.1 Dec-09 5.3
Aug-04 5.0 Jan-10 5.4
Sep-04 4.7 Feb-10 5.3
Oct-04 4.6 Mar-10 5.4
Nov-04 4.6 Apr-10 5.2
Dec-04 4.5 May-10 5.0
Jan-05 4.5 Jun-10 5.3
Feb-05 4.4 Jul-10 5.4
Mar-05 4.3 Aug-10 5.5
Apr-05 4.2 Sep-10 5.6
May-05 4.2 Oct-10 5.6
Jun-05 4.3 Nov-10 5.5
Jul-05 4.5 Dec-10 5.3
Aug-05 4.5 Jan-11 5.3
Sep-05 4.3 Feb-11 5.4
Oct-05 4.0 Mar-11 5.4
Nov-05 4.2 Apr-11 5.5
Dec-05 4.0 May-11 5.5
Asymmetric trimmed median core of inflation expectations (Pearson’s coeff.)
Jan-01 4.9 Jun-06 3.6
Feb-01 4.6 Jul-06 3.7
Mar-01 4.7 Aug-06 3.7
Apr-01 4.5 Sep-06 3.9
May-01 4.3 Oct-06 3.9
Jun-01 4.4 Nov-06 4.0
Jul-Ol 4.5 Dec-06 4.2
Aug-01 5.1 Jan-07 4.2
Sep-01 5.5 Feb-07 4.2
Oct-01 7.9 Mar-07 4.3
Nov-01 10.1 Apr-07 4.4
Dec-01 11.6 May-07 4.7
Jan-02 10.3 Jun-07 5.1
Feb-02 9.8 Jul-07 5.3
Mar-02 9.0 Aug-07 5.3
Apr-02 8.5 Sep-07 5.2
May-02 8.1 Oct-07 5.3
Jun-02 7.5 Nov-07 5.4
Jul-02 6.8 Dec-07 5.1
Aug-02 6.4 Jan-08 4.7
Sep-02 6.2 Feb-08 4.5
Oct-02 6.1 Mar-08 4.3
Nov-02 6.0 Apr-08 4.1
Dec-02 6.0 May-08 4.0
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Jan-03 5.8 Jun-08 4.1
Feb-03 5.3 Jul-08 4.1
Mar-03 5.4 Aug-08 4.1
Apr-03 5.5 Sep-08 4.3
May-03 5.7 Oct-08 4.3
Jun-03 5.9 Nov-08 4.4
Jul-03 5.9 Dec-08 4.5
Aug-03 6.1 Jan-09 4.5
Sep-03 6.1 Feb-09 4.4
Oct-03 6.2 Mar-09 4.6
Nov-03 6.0 Apr-09 4.7
Dec-03 5.8 May-09 4.9
Jan-04 5.6 Jun-09 4.9
Feb-04 5.4 Jul-09 5.0
Mar-04 5.3 Aug-09 5.0
Apr-04 5.4 Sep-09 5.1
May-04 5.2 Oct-09 5.1
Jun-04 5.1 Nov-09 5.1
Jul-04 5.1 Dec-09 5.3
Aug-04 5.0 Jan-10 5.4
Sep-04 4.7 Feb-10 5.3
Oct-04 4.6 Mar-10 5.3
Nov-04 4.6 Apr-10 5.3
Dec-04 4.5 May-10 5.0
Jan-05 4.5 Jun-10 5.2
Feb-05 4.4 Jul-10 5.4
Mar-05 4.3 Aug-10 5.5
Apr-05 4.2 Sep-10 5.7
May-05 4.2 Oct-10 5.7
Jun-05 4.4 Nov-10 5.5
Jul-05 4.5 Dec-10 5.3
Aug-05 4.5 Jan-11 5.3
Sep-05 4.3 Feb-11 5.3
Oct-05 4.1 Mar-11 5.4
Nov-05 4.2 Apr-11 5.5
Dec-05 4.1 May-11 5.5
Symmetric core of inflation expectations
Jan-01 4.8 Jun-06 3.5
Feb-01 4.6 Jul-06 3.6
Mar-01 4.7 Aug-06 3.7
Apr-01 4.4 Sep-06 3.8
May-01 4.4 Oct-06 3.9
Jun-01 4.4 Nov-06 4.0
Jul-01 4.6 Dec-06 4.2
Aug-01 5.1 Jan-07 4.2
Sep-01 5.5 Feb-07 4.2
Oct-01 7.7 Mar-07 4.4
Nov-01 10.4 Apr-07 4.4
Dec-01 11.3 May-07 4.7
Jan-02 10.5 Jun-07 5.0
Feb-02 9.9 Jul-07 5.3
Mar-02 9.4 Aug-07 5.3
Apr-02 8.6 Sep-07 5.1
May-02 8.2 Oct-07 5.2
Jun-02 7.7 Nov-07 5.4
J
A
S
Oul-02 6.9 Dec-07 5.1
ug-02 6.4 Jan-08 4.8
ep-02 6.2 Feb-08 4.5
ct-02 6.1 Mar-08 4.2
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Nov-02 6.0 Apr-08 4.1
Dec-02 5.9 May-08 4.0
Jan-03 5.7 Jun-08 4.1
Feb-03 5.4 Jul-08 4.1
Mar-03 5.4 Aug-08 4.1
Apr-03 5.5 Sep-08 4.2
May-03 5.8 Oct-08 4.3
Jun-03 6.0 Nov-08 4.4
Jul-03 6.0 Dec-08 4.5
Aug-03 6.1 Jan-09 4.5
Sep-03 6.1 Feb-09 4.5
Oct-03 6.1 Mar-09 4.6
Nov-03 6.0 Apr-09 4.7
Dec-03 5.8 May-09 4.8
Jan-04 5.5 Jun-09 4.9
Feb-04 5.4 Jul-09 5.1
Mar-04 5.4 Aug-09 5.1
Apr-04 5.5 Sep-09 5.1
May-04 5.2 Oct-09 5.1
Jun-04 5.1 Nov-09 5.2
Jul-04 5.1 Dec-09 5.3
Aug-04 5.0 Jan-10 5.4
Sep-04 4.8 Feb-10 5.3
Oct-04 4.6 Mar-10 5.4
Nov-04 4.5 Apr-10 5.2
Dec-04 4.5 May-10 5.1
Jan-05 4.5 Jun-10 5.2
Feb-05 4.4 Jul-10 5.4
Mar-05 4.2 Aug-10 5.4
Apr-05 4.1 Sep-10 5.6
May-05 4.2 Oct-10 5.6
Jun-05 4.4 Nov-10 5.6
Jul-05 4.5 Dec-10 5.3
Aug-05 4.6 Jan-11 5.3
Sep-05 4.3 Feb-11 5.4
Oct-05 4.1 Mar-11 5.5
Nov-05 4.2 Apr-11 5.5
Dec-05 4.0 May-11 5.5
Asymmetric trimmed mean core of inflation expectations (asymmetry from the 3rd moment)
Jan-01 4.9 Jun-06 3.5
Feb-01 4.6 Jul-06 3.6
Mar-01 4.7 Aug-06 3.6
Apr-01 4.3 Sep-06 3.7
May-01 4.3 Oct-06 3.8
Jun-01 4.6 Nov-06 3.9
Jul-Ol 4.6 Dec-06 4.1
Aug-01 5.2 Jan-07 4.3
Sep-01 5.8 Feb-07 4.2
Oct-Ol 8.2 Mar-07 4.4
Nov-01 10.4 Apr-07 4.3
Dec-01 11.2 May-07 4.8
Jan-02 10.8 Jun-07 5.1
Feb-02 10.1 Jul-07 5.3
Mar-02 9.6 Aug-07 5.2
Apr-02 8.9 Sep-07 5.1
May-02 8.2 Oct-07 5.2
Jun-02 7.7 Nov-07 5.4
Jul-02 6.9 Dec-07 5.1
Aug-02 6.6 Jan-08 4.9
F.A. de Carvalho / EconomiA 14 (2013) 11–26 25
Table A5 (Continued )
Sep-02 6.3 Feb-08 4.5
Oct-02 6.1 Mar-08 4.2
Nov-02 6.0 Apr-08 4.1
Dec-02 5.9 May-08 4.0
Jan-03 5.7 Jun-08 4.0
Feb-03 5.4 Jul-08 4.1
Mar-03 5.4 Aug-08 4.1
Apr-03 5.5 Sep-08 4.2
May-03 5.8 Oct-08 4.3
Jun-03 6.1 Nov-08 4.4
Jul-03 6.1 Dec-08 4.5
Aug-03 6.2 Jan-09 4.5
Sep-03 6.2 Feb-09 4.5
Oct-03 6.2 Mar-09 4.5
Nov-03 6.1 Apr-09 4.7
Dec-03 5.9 May-09 4.9
Jan-04 5.7 Jun-09 4.9
Feb-04 5.5 Jul-09 5.1
Mar-04 5.4 Aug-09 5.2
Apr-04 5.5 Sep-09 5.2
May-04 5.2 Oct-09 5.2
Jun-04 5.1 Nov-09 5.3
Jul-04 5.1 Dec-09 5.4
Aug-04 4.9 Jan-10 5.5
Sep-04 4.8 Feb-10 5.4
Oct-04 4.6 Mar-10 5.4
Nov-04 4.5 Apr-10 5.2
Dec-04 4.5 May-10 5.0
Jan-05 4.5 Jun-10 5.3
Feb-05 4.4 Jul-10 5.5
Mar-05 4.2 Aug-10 5.5
Apr-05 4.1 Sep-10 5.6
May-05 4.1 Oct-10 5.6
Jun-05 4.3 Nov-10 5.5
Jul-05 4.5 Dec-10 5.3
Aug-05 4.5 Jan-11 5.3
Sep-05 4.2 Feb-11 5.4
Oct-05 4.0 Mar-11 5.5
Nov-05 4.1 Apr-11 5.5
Dec-05 4.0 May-11 5.5
Asymmetric trimmed mean core of inflation expectations (Pearson coeff.)
Jan-01 4.9 Jun-06 3.5
Feb-01 4.7 Jul-06 3.6
Mar-01 4.7 Aug-06 3.7
Apr-01 4.4 Sep-06 3.8
May-01 4.3 Oct-06 3.9
Jun-01 4.5 Nov-06 3.9
Jul-Ol 4.6 Dec-06 4.2
Aug-01 5.2 Jan-07 4.3
Sep-01 5.6 Feb-07 4.2
Oct-01 7.9 Mar-07 4.3
Nov-01 10.1 Apr-07 4.4
Dec-01 11.2 May-07 4.8
Jan-02 10.6 Jun-07 5.1
Feb-02 9.9 Jul-07 5.3
M
A
M
Jar-02 9.3 Aug-07 5.3
pr-02 8.5 Sep-07 5.2
ay-02 8.2 Oct-07 5.2
un-02 7.5 Nov-07 5.4
26 F.A. de Carvalho / EconomiA 14 (2013) 11–26
Table A5 (Continued )
Jul-02 6.8 Dec-07 5.1
Aug-02 6.4 Jan-08 4.8
Sep-02 6.2 Feb-08 4.5
Oct-02 6.1 Mar-08 4.3
Nov-02 6.0 Apr-08 4.2
Dec-02 5.9 May-08 4.0
Jan-03 5.8 Jun-08 4.1
Feb-03 5.4 Jul-08 4.1
Mar-03 5.4 Aug-08 4.1
Apr-03 5.5 Sep-08 4.2
May-03 5.7 Oct-08 4.3
Jun-03 5.9 Nov-08 4.4
Jul-03 6.0 Dec-08 4.5
Aug-03 6.1 Jan-09 4.5
Sep-03 6.1 Feb-09 4.4
Oct-03 6.1 Mar-09 4.6
Nov-03 6.0 Apr-09 4.7
Dec-03 5.8 May-09 4.9
Jan-04 5.6 Jun-09 4.9
Feb-04 5.4 Jul-09 5.0
Mar-04 5.4 Aug-09 5.1
Apr-04 5.4 Sep-09 5.2
May-04 5.2 Oct-09 5.1
Jun-04 5.1 Nov-09 5.2
Jul-04 5.1 Dec-09 5.4
Aug-04 5.0 Jan-10 5.5
Sep-04 4.8 Feb-10 5.3
Oct-04 4.5 Mar-10 5.3
Nov-04 4.6 Apr-10 5.3
Dec-04 4.5 May-10 5.0
Jan-05 4.5 Jun-10 5.2
Feb-05 4.4 Jul-10 5.5
Mar-05 4.2 Aug-10 5.5
Apr-05 4.1 Sep-10 5.7
May-05 4.2 Oct-10 5.7
Jun-05 4.4 Nov-10 5.5
Jul-05 4.5 Dec-10 5.3
Aug-05 4.5 Jan-11 5.3
Sep-05 4.3 Feb-11 5.3
Oct-05 4.0 Mar-11 5.4
Nov-05 4.2 Apr-11 5.5
Dec-05 4.1 May-11 5.5
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